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The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An
Idea Whose Time Should Not Have Come
Christopher Slobogin*
The occasionally controversial consequences of the insanity de-
fense, epitomized by John Hinckley's acquittal,1 have recently
spawned a rash of legislative attempts to prevent similar outcomes
in future cases. Three states have abolished the insanity defense
entirely, permitting evidence of mental abnormality only when
relevant to the state of mind required for the offense.2 Several
other states have opted for less dramatic steps: tinkering with the
insanity test;3 shifting the burden of proof to the defendant;4 or
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida School of Law. B.A. 1973,
Princeton University; J.D. 1977, LL.M. 1979, University of Virginia. The author was
the Reporter for Part VII, Commitment of Nonresponsibility Acquittees, of the ABA
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards. The author would like to acknowledge
Ingo Keilitz, Director, Institute on Mental Disability & the Law, National Center for
State Courts, Williamsburg, Virginia, for providing the author with much of the data
upon which this Article is based, and Susan Seigle, a University of Florida law stu-
dent, for her research assistance.
1. United States v. Hinckley, Crim. No. 81-306 (D.D.C. June 21, 1982).
2. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201 (1983) ("Evi-
dence of mental disease or defect is not admissible in a trial on the merits unless the
defendant... files a written notice of his purpose to rely on a mental disease or
defect to prove that he did not have a particular state of mind which is an essential
element of the offense charged."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (Supp. 1983)
(mental illness is not a defense unless mental state is a required element of the
crime).
For a critique of this approach toward mental abnormality, see Bonnie, The Moral
Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 195-96 (1983).
3. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 25(b) (West 1982) (changing insanity test from
the Model Penal Code formulation to a version of the M'Naghten test).
4. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-502(B) (Supp. 1984-1985) (burden on de-
fendant by clear and convincing evidence); IND. CODE § 35-41-4-1(b) (1981) (burden on
March-May 1985 Vol. 53 Nos. 3-4
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both.5 By far the most popular "solution" to the "insanity defense
problem," however, is what has become known as the guilty but
mentally ill verdict.
Although there are as many variations of the guilty but men-
tally ill verdict as there are statutes endorsing it, all such legisla-
tion is designed to provide the factfinder with an additional option
to the three traditional verdicts of guilty, not guilty, and not guilty
by reason of insanity. Under the typical formulation,6 if the jury
finds a defendant who asserts the insanity defense guilty7 and not
insane, it may alternatively find him guilty but mentally ill at the
time of the offense. If the defendant is found guilty but mentally
ill the court may impose any sentence appropriate for the offense,
but the defendant is eligible for treatment in prison or a mental
hospital while incarcerated. Proponents of guilty but mentally ill
legislation hope to reduce insanity acquittals and provide greater
protection to the public by offering judges and juries a compro-
mise verdict that purportedly ensures both prolonged incarcera-
tion and treatment for the mentally ill offender.8
defendant by a preponderance of the evidence); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 315(a) (1983)
(burden on defendant by a preponderance of the evidence).
5. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010, .040 (Supp. 1984) (burden on defendant to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that, because of a mental disease or defect, he did not
appreciate the nature and quality of his act). Alaska had placed the burden on the
prosecution to disprove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. § 12.45.083(b) (re-
pealed 1982).
6. The text describes the Michigan statute, MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 768.36 (1982),
which has been the model for other states. See also McGraw, Farthing-Capowich &
Keilitz, The "Guilty But Mentally Ill" Plea and Verdict. Current State of Knowledge,
30 Vii. L. REV. 117, 128-41 (1984) (table decribing the various guilty but mentally ill
statutes). That article, and in particular the tables it contains, is an extremely useful
source on legal aspects of the guilty but mentally ill verdict.
7. As a prerequisite to finding guilt, the jury must find that the actus reus and
mens rea requirements for the crime were met.
8. See, ag., Smith, Limiting the Insanity Defense: A Rational Approach to Irra-
tional Crimes, 47 Mo. L. REV. 605, 614 (1982) (The verdict "presents a middleground
that may be seized by a jury as a point of compromise or as a means of providing
recognition of responsibility while assuring some form of consideration of the defend-
ant's mental state at the sentencing stage of the proceedings."); Note, Insanity -
Guilty But Mentally Ill - Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness,
12 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 351, 369 (1979) (under guilty but mentally ill legislation,
"rather than having the door revolve from a mental facility into the street, it revolves
from one secured facility to another, thereby assuring the public protection"); Com-
ment, Guilty But Mentally Il" A Reasonable Compromise for Pennsylvania, 85 DICK.
L. REV. 289, 309 (1981) ("The GBMI [guilty but mentally ill] verdict represents a true
compromise between those who advocate liberalizing the insanity defense and those
who would abolish it altogether."); Taylor, Too Much Justice, HARPER'S, Sept. 1982, at
65 (The "alternative verdict of 'guilty but mentally ill'... should be adopted more
widely to deal with the John Hinckleys of this world, the partly crazies, who deserve
neither to be absolved of responsibility nor to be treated just like ordinary
criminals.").
In introducing Illinois' guilty but mentally ill proposal, Governor Thompson stated-
"Most importantly, [the verdict] is designed 'to protect the public from violence in-
flicted by persons with mental ailments who slipped through the cracks in the crimi-
1985] 495HeinOnline  -- 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  495 1984-1985
The guilty but mentally ill verdict has received increasing atten-
tion. Several states had already passed or were seriously consider-
ing legislation establishing a guilty but mentally ill verdict before
John Hinckley's 1982 acquittal vaulted the idea into national
prominence. 9 Today at least twelve states have adopted some ver-
sion of the verdict10 and perhaps twenty others have considered or
are considering similar statutes.11
Yet despite the popularity of the guilty but mentally ill scheme,
the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice Mental Health
Standards, 2 the American Psychiatric Association Statement on
the Insanity Defense,'13 and the National Mental Health Associa-
tion's Commission on the Insanity Defense14 all have recom-
nal justice system."' Thompson, A Message to the Eighty-Second General Assembly,
State of Illinois, Technicalities in the Criminal Justice Process: Closing the Loopholes
Through Which the Guilty Escape 8 (Apr. 23, 1981) (quoting People v. Seefeld, 95
Mich. App. 197, 199, 290 N.W.2d 123, 124 (1980)).
9. Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois had passed legislation providing for a guilty but
mentally ill verdict at the time of Hinckley's acquittal: Michigan in 1975; Indiana in
1980; and Illinois in 1981. See 1975 Mich. Pub. Acts 180 (codified at MICH. Comp. LAWS
§ 768.36 (1982)); 1982 Ind. Acts 204 (codified at IND. CODE § 35-36-2-3 (Supp. 1982));
1981 Ill. Laws 82-553 (codified at ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-2(b) (1981)). Alaska,
Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, and New Mexico all passed such legislation in 1982.
See 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 143, § 22 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040 (Supp.
1984)); 63 Del. Laws 328 (1982) (codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. U1, § 408 (Supp. 1984));
1982 Ga. Laws 22 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Michie 1985)); 1981 Ky. Acts
113 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. § 504.120 (Supp. 1982)); 1982 N.M. Laws 55 (codified at
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-3 (Supp. 1983)). Connecticut enacted and repealed its statute
in the same year. 1983 Conn. Acts 486 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-a-13 (Supp.
1983) (repealed 1983)).
10. In addition to those states listed in note 9, supra, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, and Utah have adopted the guilty but mentally ill verdict. See
1982 Pa. Laws 286 (codified at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314 (1983)); 1984 S.C. Acts 396
(codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985)); 1983 S.D. Sess. Laws 174
(codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23a-7-2 (Supp. 1983)); 1980 Utah Laws 49
(codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-1 (Supp. 1983)).
11. In 1982 roughly two dozen states in addition to those listed in note 9, supra,
were considering the insanity plea. N.Y. Times, June 24, 1982, at D21, col. 1.
12. The ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards provide: "Statutes
which supplant or supplement the verdict of not guilty by reason of mental nonre-
sponsibility [insanity] with a verdict of guilty but mentally ill should not be enacted."
ABA CRnMNAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-6.10(b) [hereinafter cited as
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, 7-x.y]. The ABA House of Delegates formally adopted
the Mental Health Standards as chapter seven of the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIUMINAL
JUSTICE (2d ed. 1980) on August 7, 1984. Nevertheless, when considering each chapter
of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, the House of Delegates votes only upon
the black letter standards. Therefore, the commentary accompanying the Mental
Health Standards does not represent ABA policy;, its purpose is to assist practitioners
by explaining the Mental Health Standards, underlying legal and mental health ratio-
nales. All citations to the commentary are to the August 1984 edition of the Mental
Health Standards submitted to the House of Delegates. Some minor changes should
be expected in the final commentary, which will appear in the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, because the Standing Committee on Association Standards for
Criminal Justice is presently updating the commentary.
13. American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity Defense 9-10
(Dec. 1982) [hereinafter cited as APA Statement].
14. NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 32-34 (Mar. 1983) (copy on file
at the George Washington Law Review). On the other hand, of the six state psycho-
logical associations that have reported a position on the insanity defense, three favor
the guilty but mentally ill verdict. Melton, Organized Psychology and Legal Poli-
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mended against its adoption. This Article attempts to justify the
ABA's recommendation. Part I summarizes the concerns that
gave rise to the guilty but mentally ill verdict and suggests that
those concerns are exaggerated. It concludes that the insanity de-
fense has not been significantly abused, nor has it led, in most
cases, to inappropriate release following acquittal. Acknowledg-
ing, nonetheless, some need both to reduce the potential for mis-
taken outcomes and to provide greater protection to the public,
Part II investigates the guilty but mentally ill verdict on its own
terms, by examining the available data addressing its implementa-
tion. Although equivocal, the results of this research strongly sug-
gest that the new verdict fails to achieve its stated goals. Part III
argues that, regardless of its practical success, the guilty but men-
tally ill verdict should not be adopted because it introduces a for-
eign and meaningless element into the criminal justice system.
Finally, Part IV demonstrates that the verdict is unnecessary,
even assuming that the current system requires reform and that
the guilty but mentally ill verdict effectively accomplishes its
goals ii- amanner compatible with the theoretical foundation of
the criminal law. Redefining the insanity defense, carefully struc-
turing the commitment process for insanity acquittees, and ensur-
ing treatment for those found guilty or not guilty by reason of
insanity would more directly and effectively address the concerns
underlying the current attraction toward the guilty but mentally
ill verdict.
I. The Current System: Is It Dramatically Flawed?
Dissatisfaction with the insanity defense has provided the impetus
for the guilty but mentally ill verdict.15 In almost every state that
adopted the verdict prior to January 1,1985, vociferous public reac-
tion to one or two incidents- either a controversial insanity ac-
quittal or the commission of a violent act by someone recently
released from a hospital for the insane - apparently triggered the
legislation. In Michigan, the first state to pass guilty but mentally
ill legislation, a murder and a rape committed by two insanity ac-
quittees within two years of their discharge as "safe and sane"
sparked the statute's passage.1 6 Similarly, public outcry over vio-
cymaking: Involvement in the Post-Hinckley Debate, in PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY:
RFSEARCH AND PRACTICE 2 (1983).
15. See supra note 8.
16. Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ilk An Historical and Constitutional Analy-
sis, 53 U. DET. J. URB. L. 471, 472 (1976). The Michigan Supreme Court's decision in
People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974) was perhaps the penulti-
mate catalyst of Michigan's guilty but mentally ill legislation. McQuillan required
that the state release within 60 days any insanity acquittee confined at the time of the
decision who did not meet the criteria for civil commitment. Within a year, 79% of
1985] HeinOnline  -- 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  497 1984-1985
lent crimes committed by former insanity acquittees spurred the
enactment of the guilty but mentally ill alternative in both Illi-
nois17 and Georgia.18 In Indiana, several notorious cases involving
assertion of the insanity defense focused public and legislative
attention on the guilty but mentally ill verdict as a way to prevent
defendants from evading conviction. 19 Finally, John Hinckley's
acquittal galvanized support for guilty but mentally ill legislation
in several states.
20
Although the moral nature of the insanity inquiry makes any
conclusion about the "correctness" of a given insanity verdict
problematic,21 some individuals probably are wrongly found not
guilty by reason of insanity. And it is indisputable that some in-
sanity acquittees commit violent crimes once released. But recent
data suggest that "inappropriate" insanity acquittals and dis-
the state's 270 acquittees had been released, including the individuals mentioned in
the text. Blunt & Stock, Guilty But Mentally Ill: The Mfichigan Experience, Presen-
tation at American Association of Psychiatry & Law, Portland, Oregon 5 (Oct. 28,
1983) (copy on file at the George Washington Law Review). One state legislator de-
clared that Michigan's guilty but mentally ill law was designed "to circumvent the
McQuillan decision." Mental Health.- Guilty But Mentally ll: Hearings on H.B. 4363,
78th Leg. (1975) (statement of Rep. Rosenbaum).
17. Comment, Punishment Versus Treatment of the Guilty But Mentally 11, 74 J.
Calm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 428, 435 (1983).
18. According to Dr. Ilhan Ermulu, a precipitating factor behind Georgia's guilty
but mentally ill legislation was a multiple murder commited by an insanity acquittee
shortly after his release. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, THE "GUILTY BuT
IENTALLY ILL" PLEA AND VERDICT. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY: FINAL REPORT SuBMIT-
TED TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JusTICE 2-3 (work-
ing draft Nov. 15, 1984) (copy on file at the George Washington Law Review. This
report comprises three sections: a final report; descriptive data; and a telephone sur-
vey. References hereinafter will cite the appropriate section.). This report is an in-
valuable source of data on the guilty but mentally ill verdict.
19. Apparently the controversy engendered by the insanity plea in Judy v. State,
416 N.E.2d 95 (Ind. 1981), directly provoked the passage of Indiana's guilty but men-
tally ill statute. See Note, Indiana's Guilty But Mentally Ill Statute: Blueprint to
Beguile the Jury, 57 IND. L.J. 639, 639 (1982). Ironically, the defendant, charged with
the murder of a woman and her three small children, was ultimately convicted and
executed. Id. at 639 nA. State v. Kiritsis, 269 Ind. 550, 381 N.E.2d 1245 (1978), which
resulted in the insanity acquittal of a defendant who kidnapped a business executive
and held him at gunpoint before television cameras, may also have played a role.
Note, supra, at 639 n.2, 640 n.6.
20. According to a survey conducted by the National Center for State Courts, Del-
aware, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah adopted the guilty but mentally ill
verdict partly because of outrage over the Hinckley verdict. NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE COURTS (Final Report), supra note 18, at 2; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE PROFILE (SOUTH DAKOTA) 2 (1984); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE PROFILE (UTAH) 3 (1984) (copy on file at the George Washington Law
Review).
21. See generally A. GOLDSTEiN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 1-22 (1967). Professor
Goldstein's 1967 conclusions remain valid today:
The insanity defense is caught up in some of the most controversial ideo-
logical currents of our time. The direction it takes depends, essentially,
upon the place in social control one assigns to the criminal law as it com-
petes with other methods of regulation by the state, to each of the themes
underlying the criminal law, to the confidence one has that the mentally
ill offender can be identified and treated, and the importance one attaches
to the idea of blame. However difficult it has been in the past to find one's
way among considerations of this sort, events are conspiring to make the
problem even more complex.
Id. at 20.
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charges are both infrequent and, for the most part, unavoidable.
Moreover, although the incidents that trigger public and legisla-
tive support for guilty but mentally ill legislation are deplorable,
they are not so common or egregious as to warrant creation of an
entirely novel verdict or, for that matter, any other major restruc-
turing of the system.
Even in states with expansive versions of the insanity test and
no guilty but mentally ill verdict, significantly less than one per-
cent of all felony cases result in insanity acquittals. For instance,
in 1980, when California used the American Law Institute's rela-
tively unrestrictive insanity formulation, the state experienced
only 259 insanity acquittals, representing .6% of all felony arrests
for that year.22 In 1979, two years before Illinois enacted its guilty
but mentally ill statute, only an estimated fifty defendants - .23%
of all felony arrests - were acquitted under that state's version of
the ALI's insanity test.2 3 Nationwide statistics indicate that in
1978, when only one state had passed guilty but mentally ill legis-
lation, the 1,625 defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity
accounted for only 8.1% of the 19,171 admissions to mental hospi-
tals in the United States,24 an average of less than thirty-three ac-
quittals for each state.25
Other research suggests that most of these acquittals were
"appropriate." In many states, over sixty percent of all insanity
acquittals result from plea bargaining or a quasi-plea-bargain ar-
rangement, rather than a full-fledged trial.26 In these cases, the
prosecution stipulates that the defendant should be hospitalized,
rather than convicted and imprisoned. Thus, only a small number
of defendants have an opportunity to somehow "hoodwink" a trial
22. Turner & Ornstein, Distinguishing the Wicked from the Mentally 174 3 CAL.
LAW. 40, 42 (Mar. 1983).
23. Memorandum from Donald M. McIntyre, Associate Executive Director of the
American Bar Foundation, to Richard Lynch, Executive Director, ABA Standing
Committee on Criminal Justice Standard 3 (Aug. 3, 1982) [hereinafter cited as McIn-
tyre Memorandum].
24. Steadman & Braff, Defendants Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity, in MEN-
TALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOcIAL SCIENcE 109,
110 (H. Steadman & J. Monahan eds. 1983).
25. In 1978, there were approximately 2,284,495 felony arrests in the United
States. FBI UNIFORm CRImE REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 185 (1979).
26. From 1981 to 1983, 85 (61%) of Georgia's 138 insanity acquittals were by in-
sanity plea. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Descriptive Data), supra note 18,
at 7. In Oregon, between 1978 and 1980, 79% percent of all insanity acquittals resulted
from pretrial agreements between prosecution and defense; 18% resulted from bench
trials, and only three percent resulted from jury trials. Rogers & Bloom, Characteris-
tics of Persons Committed to Oregon's Psychiatric Security Review Board, 10 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 155, 158 (1982). In Michigan, 90% of the defendants
found not guilty by reason of insanity received non-jury trials, often through a quasi-
plea-bargaining process. Smith & Hall, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally
Ill Verdict. An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 77, 94 (1982).
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jury or judge in the first place. And of those pleas which are con-
tested, the insanity defense tends to prevail in less than half the
cases,27 suggesting that the good sense of the judge or jury ferrets
out most spurious insanity claims.
Perhaps more importantly, defendants acquitted by reason of
insanity rarely obtain quick release, and when they are released it
is usually appropriate, given the limited ability to predict future
behavior.28 Virtually all states automatically confine insanity ac-
quittees for an initial evaluation period of up to ninety days,29 and
they may continue to detain the acquittees until they are no
longer mentally ill or dangerous. 30 In most states, the statutory
criteria for release are very restrictive. 31 As a result, persons ac-
quitted by reason of insanity in these states spend, on average, al-
most as much time in confinement as do individuals convicted of
27. The overall success rate is approximately 25%. See, e.g., Steadman & Braff,
supra note 24, at 118 (between 1969 and 1976, Hawaii acquitted approximately 19% of
those who pleaded insanity); Steadman, Monahan, Hartstone, Davis & Robbins, Men-
tally Disordered Offenders: A National Survey of Patients and Facilities, 6 L. &
HuM. BEHAV. 31, 36 (1982) (Erie County, New York, acquitted roughly 25% of those
who pleaded insanity); NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION, supra note 14, at 15
(acquittal rate for New Jersey in 1982 was approximately 30%).
The success rate at trial is probably higher, however. If, in a group of 200, 50 are
acquitted by reason of insanity, as many as 20 (40%) and as few as 5 (10%) will be
acquitted at a trial, with the number acquitted at trial in the average jurisdiction prob-
ably falling closer to the latter figure. See supra note 26. Of the 150 who are con-
victed, approximately 15 will be found guilty through the trial process. See also
Newman, Reshape the Deal; 9 TRIAL 11, 11 (May/June 1973) (ninety percent of all
felony convictions are obtained through plea bargaining). As a result, the success rate
for insanity pleas which go to trial is probably a little less than 50% in most
jurisdictions.
28. See generally Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 97,
110-19 (1984) (describing studies assessing the validity of clinical predictions of
dangerousness).
29. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-105(4) (1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(1)
(1973) (upon motion of Attorney General); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Michie 1985);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(2) (Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 103 (1981);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040 (I) (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(4)
(McKinney 1983); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 3637(a) (1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(I)
(West 1985).
30. Morris, Acquittal by Reason of Insanity: Developments in the Law, in MEN.
TALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SocIAL SCIENCE 70-72
(H. Steadman & J. Monahan eds. 1983).
31. As of 1976, 18 states explicitly applied more restrictive release criteria to in-
sanity acquittees than to civilly committed patients. See German & Singer, Punishing
the Not Guilty: Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29
RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1080-81 (Tables) (1976). In other states the release criteria for
criminal commitment resemble those for civil commitment, but their manner of im-
plementation is significantly more restrictive. See Morris, supra note 30, at 72-75
(describing additional procedures and burdens of criminal commitment); see also
German & Singer, supra, at 1059-74 (detailing differences in the authority making the
discharge decision, in burdens of proof, in periodic review provisions, and in condi-
tional release practices); Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquitta 94
HARV. L. REV. 605, 606 (1981) (separate procedures for civil and criminal commitment
exist in many states, indicating that those states view insanity acquittees differently
from candidates for civil commitment). Civil commitment is the process by which the
state involuntarily hospitalizes mentally ill individuals who have not been charged
with crime but who are considered dangerous to themselves or others. See, e.g., Les-
sard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,1084-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for
a more specifw order, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), order on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.
Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975).
VOL. 53:494
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similar crimes.
32
In a few states, recent judicial decisions and statutes have re-
laxed the release criteria for insanity acquittees, 33 finding no ra-
tional basis for distinguishing between insanity acquittees and
persons subjected to civil commitment.3 But even in these juris-
dictions, a significant proportion of insanity acquittees remain con-
fined for prolonged periods of time.35 As Professors Katz and
32. One study conducted in New York found no appreciable difference in dura-
tion of confinement between matched acquittees and felons when the acquittees were
hospitalized in a Department of Corrections facility. Pantle, Pasewark & Steadman,
Comparing institutionalization periods and subsequent arrests of insanity acquittees
and convicted felons, 8 J. PsYcHIATRY & L. 305, 309-12 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Pantle, Pasewark & Steadman, Subsequent Arrests]. Another found that acquittees
were released 10 months earlier than felons after jurisdiction over the acquittees was
transferred to the Department of Mental Health. Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, De-
tention and Rearrest Rates of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity and
Convicted Felons, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 892, 893-94 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, Rearrest Rates]. In Connecticut, which limits hospital-
ization of acquittees to the maximum prison term prescribed for the offense, a study
indicated that acquittees were released an average of 19 months earlier than the
felons with whom they were paired. Phillips & Pasewark, Insanity Plea in Connecti-
cu4 8 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYC'iATRY & L. 335, 340 (1980).
In contrast, an Arizona study found no significant difference in length of confine-
ment for felons and acquittees between 1955 and 1978. Kahn & Raifman, Hospitaliza-
tion v. Imprisonment and the Insanity Plea, 8 CFUM. JUST. & BEHAV. 483, 488 (1981).
As the authors admit, however, the time period of the study encompassed changes in
the philosophy, treatment methods, and practices of mental hospitals and probably of
penal institutions. Id. at 489.
Finally, a Washington, D.C., study found that acquittee confinement (1,950 days) far
exceeded inmate confinement (1,050 days), although no attempt to match the two
groups was made. Dobbs & Henneberry, Special Report on the Commitment (St.
Elizabeth Hospital, Washington, D.C., June 1983) (reported in Steadman, Empirical
Research on the Insanity Defense, 477 ANNALS 58, 64 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Em-
pirical Research]).
None of these studies considered the pretrial confinement of insanity acquittees; yet
most spend many months hospitalized as incompetent to stand trial before they are
found not guilty by reason of insanity. In at least one state, this period of confinement
averages 38.4 months. McIntyre Memorandum, supra note 23, at 7.
33. See, e.g., Benham v. Edwards, 501 F. Supp. 1050, 1056-59 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Wil-
son v. State, 259 Ind. 375, 383, 287 N.E.2d 875, 880 (1972); People v. McQuillan, 392
Mich. 511, 546-47, 221 N.W.2d 569, 586 (1974); State v. Krol, 87 N.J. 236, 249, 344 A.2d
289, 296 (1975).
34. See MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12, 7-7.4, commentary at 413-18
(adopting the view that insanity acquittees should be subjected to general commit-
ment procedures unless the acquittees differ from the characteristic civil committee).
But see infra text accompanying notes 140-45.
35. A study of the five-year period after the Michigan Supreme Court decided
People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974), which equated the stan-
dards for criminal and civil commitment, showed that of the 220 defendants found not
guilty by reason of insanity, 121 were released as noncommitable. Almost half of the
remaining 99 acquittees were released within the next five years, after an average
confinement of 9.48 months. However, 55 (25%) of those acquitted by reason of in-
sanity were confined over five years. Criss & Racine, Impact of Change in Legal Stan-
dard for Those Adjudicated Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 19754979, 8 BULL. AM.
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Goldstein contend,36 the insanity defense is as much a method for
restraining those perceived to be dangerously mentally ill as it is a
means for determining criminal responsibility.
Admittedly, a sizeable proportion of released acquittees (from
six to twenty percent depending upon the study)3 7 are rearrested
for crimes against persons. However, in absolute terms, this is not
a large group. For example, assuming release of the 1,625 insanity
acquittees admitted to mental hospitals in 1978,38 a twenty percent
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 261, 266-67 (1981). The difference in mean length of stay
before and after McQuillan was approximately seven months. Id at 267.
In New Jersey, liberalization of criminal commitment standards caused a decidedly
greater change in confinement times for acquittees. In State v. Krol, 87 N.J. 236, 249,
344 A.2d 289, 296 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court equated criminal and civil
commitment in most important respects. Post-Krol acquittees in Essex County were
confined, on average, for 6.4 months - approximately a 20-month decrease in confine-
ment time relative to pre-Krol acquittees. Singer, Insanity Acquittal in the Seventies:
Observations and Empirical Analysis of One Jurisdiction, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 406, 407 (1978). However, Singer admitted that, given the nature of their of-
fenses, "many of the [46] defendants [studied] would not have received custodial
sentences if convicted." Id. Thus, conviction would not have accorded the public any
greater protection in those instances. Most importantly, six persons (all acquitted of
murder) were not released during the time period of the study; all were members-of
the 28 person post-Krol group. Id, at 408 n.11. If the eventual length of confinement
of those six acquittees conformed to the 33.4 month confinement of previous murder
acquittees in New Jersey, the post-Krol group's average confinement would easily
have more than doubled, making the difference in confinement times of pre- and post-
Krol groups similar to that found in Michigan between pre- and post-McQuillan
groups.
36. Professors Goldstein and Katz state:
Though unpleasant to acknowledge, the insanity defense is an expression
of uneasiness, conscious or unconscious, either about the adequacy of such
material elements of an offense as "mens rea" and "voluntariness," as
bases for singling out those who ought to be held criminally responsible, or
it is an expression of concern about the adequacy of civil commitment pro-
cedures to single out from among the "not guilty by reasons of insanity"
those who are mentally ill and in need of restraint.
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"- Why Not? 72 YALE L.J. 853, 868
(1963).
37. Two New York studies, a Connecticut study, and a Missouri study address this
issue. In the first New York study, at most, 19% of the released acquittees were ar-
rested for crimes against persons within one to ten years after release. Pasewark,
Pantle & Steadman, The Insanity Plea in New York State, 1965-1976, 51 N.Y. ST. B.J.
186, 221-22 (1979). This figure may be inflated because the data in the study permit
computation only of the ratio between the number of post-discharge arrests for crimes
against persons (17) and the number of discharged acquittees (107); because many of
the discharged acquittees were arrested more than once (although not necessarily for
crimes against persons), id, at 221, the number arrested for violent crimes may be
considerably fewer than 17. In the second New York study, 15% of the released ac-
quittees were rearrested for crimes against persons over a three to five year period.
Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, Rearrest Rates, supra note 32, at 895. In the Connecti-
cut study, 20% of the released acquittees were rearrested during a seven to nine year
period. Phillips & Pasewark, supra note 32, at 341. Finally, the Missouri study found,
over a three year period, a four percent rearrest rate for assaultive crime (2 out of 44).
Morrow & Peterson, Follow-up of Discharged Offenders - "Not Guilty by Reason of
Insanity" and "Criminal Sexual Psychopaths," 57 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCIENCE 31, 33 (1966).
38. It must be noted, however, that these arrest rates probably underestimate re-
cidivism to a significant extent, given the number of unreported and unsolved crimes.
See Slobogin, supra note 28, at 116-17. This distortion is not taken into account in the
text because the 20% figure used there is treated as an annual figure, whereas the
rates reported in the above studies represent the percentage of the sample arrested
over multiple-year periods ranging from three to ten years. It is assumed that inter-
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rate of recidivism would yield perhaps 325 rearrests for violent
crimes annually, or an average of 6.5 per state per year.
Moreover, those discharges that result in further crime are
largely unavoidable in an enlightened society. Given the well-
known difficulty of accurately predicting long-term dangerous-
ness - such predictions are correct less than fifty percent of the
time39 - one is tempted to recommend prolonged confinement of
all acquittees. But outweighing any resulting increase in public
safety is the indisputable fact that this scheme would inappropri-
ately deprive large numbers of individuals of their liberty. Even
assuming an unrealistic fifty percent base rate for violence over
the lifetime of the released acquittee population, automatic long-
term confinement would lead to the needless and unjustifiable in-
carceration of one out of two acquittees. In light of this concern,
the discharge decisions made by hospitals and courts should not be
too harshly criticized.
Data indicating similar recidivism rates for discharged acquit-
tees and released felons reinforce this conclusion. Three studies
have compared the recidivism rate of discharged insanity acquit-
tees with that of released felons charged with similar offenses.
Two of the studies indicate that, as groups, acquittees have slightly
lower recidivism rates than do felons. 40 The third study shows the
recidivism rates between the two groups to be about even.41 Thus,
the release of acquittees through discharge decisions is proportion-
ately no more threatening to the public than is the release of
felons on parole or at the termination of their sentences. In abso-
lute terms, of course, the release of acquittees is considerably less
inimical to public safety.
Put another way, although recidivism by released acquittees
poses significant concerns, discharge decisions involving acquittees
are no more irresponsible than are similar decisions made by sen-
tencing judges or parole boards. Further, unless we are willing to
authorize lifelong confinement, a certain amount of recidivism is
preting the data in this way "cancels out" the inadequacy of relying on arrest rates to
compute recidivism, although this assumption cannot be proven. See supra text ac-
companying note 24.
39. See generally Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second
Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 11 (1984) (modifying his
earlier assessment by concluding that the ceiling on the accuracy of clinical predic-
tions of violent behavior may be closer to 50%); see also J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49 (1982) (concluding that over a several year
period, "psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three
predictions of violent behavior... [for] institutionalized populations that had...
committed violence in the past... [and] were diagnosed as mentally ill") (emphasis
in original).
40. Pantle, Pasewark & Steadman, Subsequent Arrests, supra note 32, at 312-13;
Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, Rearrest Rates, supra note 32, at 895.
41. Phillips & Pasewark, supra note 32, at 340-42.
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inevitable, whether the individuals concerned are felons or
acquittees.
The research showing similar recidivism rates between matched
acquittees and felons also confirms the more general finding that
there is only a very weak correlation between severe mental ill-
ness and violent behavior; the most accurate predictor of violence
is not diagnosis but the number and nature of prior violent acts.42
This conclusion directly refutes the public's apparent perception
that the typical released insanity acquittee is "abnormally" dan-
gerous:43 dangerousness does not necessarily have anything to do
with "insanity" per se.
To the extent that public and legislative sentiment favoring the
guilty but mentally ill verdict is based on the belief that defend-
ants frequently abuse the insanity defense, it is unfounded. To the
extent that such sentiment stems from the impression that in-
sanity acquittees are extraordinarily violent individuals, let loose
upon acquittal or at the whim of incompetent hospital staff, it
blinks at reality. Unfortunately, one or two well-publicized inci-
dents can inaccurately, but effectively, stereotype all insanity ac-
quittees,44 and unnecessarily precipitate the passage of guilty but
42. For the best description of the literature on predicting violent behavior by
mentally ill offenders, see Monahan & Steadman, Crime and Mental Disorder. An
Epidemiological Approach, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH
145 (1983). The authors conclude:
The overarching impression that remains after reviewing the vast array of
existing epidemiological data on crime and mental disorder is that, when
one makes the appropriate controls for demographic and anamnestic fac-
tors (e.g. prior patterns of institutionalization), rates of true and treated
criminal behavior vary independently of rates of true and treated mental
disorder.
Id at 181. See also Cocozza, Melick & Steadman, Trends in Violent Cime Among Ex-
Mental Patients, 16 CRIMINOLOGY 317 (1978).
One study, based on self-reports of violence, suggests that while ex-offenders are
considerably more dangerous than either the general population or the mentally ill,
the mentally ill are no more dangerous than a random sample taken from the general
population. Steadman & Felson, Self-Reports of Violence, 22 CRIMINOLOGY 321, 336
(1984).
43. A study conducted in New York asked 413 randomly selected citizens to name
offenders they believed to be "criminally insane." Of those offenders named by more
than one interviewee, none had been found either insane or incompetent to stand
trial. In fact, all had been convicted of murder, kidnapping, or bombings. Steadman
& Cocozza, Selective Reporting and the Public's Misconceptions of the Criminally In-
sane, 41 PuB. OPINION Q. 523, 525-29 (1977-1978). The public seems quick to attach the
term "insanity" to dangerous and notorious individuals, whether or not they actually
plead the defense or are acquitted by reason of insanity.
44. Professors Saks and Kidd have described the pervasiveness of the "availabil-
ity" as a heuristic, which posits that "people are likely to judge the probability or
frequency of an event based on the ease with which they can recall instances or occur-
rences of the event." Saks & Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication:
Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAw & Soc'y REV. 123, 137 (1980-1981).
As the text suggests, availability seems to have influenced the insanity debate and
the genesis of the guilty but mentally ill verdict. A study conducted in Wyoming pro-
vides concrete evidence of this conclusion. Between 1971 and 1972, .47% of all felony
cases in that state involved an insanity plea; the plea was successful in only one of the
102 instances it was used. Yet, on average, college students in Wyoming estimated
that 37% of all criminal cases in the state involved an insanity plea and that 44% of
these were successful. Wyoming legislators gave estimates of 20 and 44%, respec-
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mentally ill legislation.
Those who would drastically reform the current system must
show more to establish the need for a major overhaul. Admit-
tedly, the insanity defense and provisions relating to the disposi-
tion of insanity acquittees may require some fine-tuning. But the
creation of an entirely new verdict is an overreaction to what in
reality are minor, although intractable, problems associated with
determining criminal responsibility and the likelihood of future
violence.
II. The Impact of the Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict
Even if flaws in the administration of the insanity defense are
minor, guilty but mentally ill legislation is not necessarily super-
fluous. Proponents of the legislation can still argue that the guilty
but mentally ill verdict provides an effective method of addressing
the problems that do afflict the current system. According to its
proponents, the verdict will reduce, if not eliminate, inappropriate
insanity acquittals, and prevent, or at least postpone, the further
commission of violent acts by mentally ill individuals.45 Addition-
ally, the verdict purportedly offers two other advantages over the
current system: by providing for hospitalization of those found
guilty but mentally ill, it assures more effective treatment for
mentally ill offenders,46 and by discouraging the insanity plea, it
minimizes the time-consuming expert battles that plague litiga-
tion of the insanity issue.47 If the verdict can accomplish these
objectives without creating new problems, then perhaps it should
be adopted despite the absence of any grave deficiencies in the cur-
rent system.
One might also support the verdict for its symbolic value as
well. Even if the public's negative attitude toward the insanity de-
fense stems from an exaggerated perception of the defense's defi-
ciencies, one cannot deny that the perception exists. Thus, the
guilty but mentally ill verdict, if it works, might do much to re-
move antipathy toward the insanity defense.
The burden here is to demonstrate that the verdict does not ef-
fectively achieve any of the practical objectives advanced by its
proponents, and that even if it did, the verdict's associated costs
seriously detract from any symbolic benefit it may offer. Meeting
this burden will in large part require examining the available
tively. Pasewark, Seidenzahl & Pantle, Opinions About the Insanity Plea 8 J. FOREN-
SIC PSYCHOLOGY 63, 66 (1981).
45. See supra note 8.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
47. See infra note 100.
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research on the verdict's impact, but to some extent will also in-
volve exposing the inadequacy of the verdict on commonsense
grounds.
A. The Effect of the Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict on
Insanity Acquittals
Proponents of guilty but mentally ill legislation seek to reduce
the number of insanity acquittals by providing the jury with a
compromise verdict which will encourage conviction in borderline
cases.48 But the available data suggest that the guilty but mentally
ill option has failed in its intended effect; the verdict has had little
or no impact on the insanity acquittal rate. Moreover, there is rea-
son to believe that any decrease in the acquittal rate which occurs
under guilty but mentally ill legislation results as much from the
improper conviction of those who should have been found insane
as from the prevention of improper insanity acquittals.
Data concerning insanity acquittals are available from four ju-
risdictions that use the guilty but mentally ill verdict: Michigan,
Illinois, Alaska, and Georgia.49 While these data must be evalu-
ated cautiously, they strongly suggest that the effect of the guilty
but mentally ill verdict on the acquittal rate is minimal.5°
Michigan has been the most widely studied jurisdiction because
its legislation has been in effect longer than any other state's and
its centralized forensic system facilitates collection of the relevant
data. In the four and one half years prior to the 1975 passage of
Michigan's guilty but mentally ill verdict, 237 persons were found
not guilty by reason of insanity, an average of roughly fifty acquit-
tals per year.51 For the seven years following the verdict's pas-
sage, the state reported roughly fifty-five insanity acquittals each
year.5 2 Expressed as a percentage of total arrests, the annual ac-
48. Several commentators have suggested that jurors actually want such a com-
promise verdict. In the most widely cited study of jury reaction to the insanity de-
fense, for instance, Professor Simon found.
Many of the jurors [studied] felt constrained by the verdict limitations
placed upon them by the court. They would like to have a way of easing
the choice between acquitting the defendant on grounds of insanity and
finding him guilty. The former designation goes further than they want to
go in distinguishing the defendant from the ordinary criminal, and the lat-
ter allows for no distinction. In many instances, the jury would have liked
to declare the defendant guilty, but insane. That kind of verdict would
permit the jurors to condemn the defendant's behavior ... [and fulfill]
their desire to commit the defendant to an institution that both punished
and treated.
R. SIMON, THE JuRY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 178 (1967).
49. 1982 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 43, § 22 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040
(1984)); 1984 Ga. Laws 22 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Michie 1985)); 1981
ill. Laws 82-553 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-2(b) (1981)); 1975 Mich. Pub.
Acts 180 (codified at MICH. Comp. LAws § 768.36 (1982)).
50. Also of interest is an informal study conducted by Steadman of six states with
guilty but mentally ill legislation, finding a "negligible change in the volume of in-
sanity acquittals, after the introduction of the guilty but mentally ill plea." Steadman,
Empirical Research, supra note 32, at 68.
51. Smith & Hall, supra note 26, at 107 (Table A).
52. Blunt & Stock, supra note 16, at 13 (Table 2).
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quittal rate has increased slightly since passage of Michigan's
guilty but mentally ill statute.53 Superficially, this outcome sug-
gests that the guilty but mentally ill verdict has failed miserably
in its attempt to reduce insanity acquittals.
Unfortunately, conclusions about the verdict's impact on in-
sanity acquittals may be confounded by three events, any one of
which could have produced the observed increase in the number
of insanity acquittals in Michigan after 1975. First, the Michigan
Supreme Court's 1974 decision in People v. McQuillan54 loosened
the release standards for criminal commitment by equating them
with the criteria for civil commitment. Then, two statutory provi-
sions, passed as part of the same package that contained the guilty
but mentally ill verdict, liberalized the definition of insanity 5 and
authorized, at state expense, a psychiatric evaluation of any indi-
gent defendant asserting an insanity defense.56 All of these legal
changes may have encouraged insanity pleas, which rose precip-
itously after 1975.57 The increase in insanity pleas may in turn
have increased the number of insanity acquittals.
It is quite possible, however, that the guilty but mentally ill leg-
islation has itself caused the increase in acquittals by increasing
the number of insanity pleas. Under Michigan's legislation, a de-
fendant must plead insanity to be considered for the guilty but
mentally ill verdict. Thus, defendants seeking a verdict of guilty
but mentally ill - perhaps believing that they are more likely
either to receive treatment or to avoid the stigma of outright con-
viction58 - may instead be found insane.
Data from Illinois, a state which also requires an insanity plea as
a predicate to a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, reinforce this
interpretation of -Michigan's experience. According to the Na-
tional Center for State Courts, the number of acquittals in Illinois
also increased after passage of the guilty but mentally ill statute,
from 124 acquittals during the thirty-three months before enact-
ment to 154 during a comparable period after the statute's effec-
tive date.59 Yet unlike Michigan, no confounding legal variables
existed in Illinois.
53. Smith & Hall, supra note 26, at 93.
54. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
55. MIcH Coiip. LAWS § 768.21(a) (1982) (effective 1975). The insanity formula-
tion changed from a combination of the M'Naghten test and the "irresistible impulse"
test to the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code formulation. See infra text
accompanying notes 116-22.
56. MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 768.20(a)(2) (1982) (effective 1975).
57. According to Doctors Blunt and Stock, the number of insanity pleas entered
increased steadily between 1976 and 1980, decreasing only slightly in 1981 and 1982.
Blunt & Stock, supra note 16, at 13 (Table 2).
58. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
59. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Final Report), supra note 18, at 37.
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In contrast, data from two other jurisdictions using the guilty
but mentally ill verdict appear to indicate that the verdict has re-
duced the frequency of insanity acquittals. Most dramatically,
Alaska reports only one insanity acquittal since the passage of its
guilty but mentally ill legislation in 1982.60 Yet the same legisla-
tion that created the verdict also changed Alaska's test for in-
sanity to the most restrictive in the country, and shifted the
burden of proving insanity to the defendant.61 Furthermore, even
before 1982, Alaska courts found very few individuals - only five
or six per year - not guilty by reason of insanity.62
Only in Georgia, the final state with relevant data, is there di-
rect evidence of a reduction in insanity acquittals. Georgia's an-
nual number of acquittals dropped from fifty-six to forty-two
between 1981 and 1983.63 The sole intervening legal change affect-
ing mentally ill offenders was Georgia's guilty but mentally ill leg-
islation, which went into effect on November 1, 1982.64 Even
here, however, the data appear ambiguous: because there were
only forty insanity acquittals in 1982, the 1981 acquittal rate seems
abnormally high.65 Without data on pre-1980 acquittal rates, it is
impossible to draw a definitive conclusion about Georgia's guilty
but mentally ill law.
Granting, nonetheless, that the verdict may marginally reduce
insanity acquittals in at least some states, it is unclear whether the
verdict prevents only inappropriate acquittals, or instead leads ju-
ries to convict defendants who should be found insane under the
prevailing standard. Again, absent an objective measure of "in-
sanity," this question is difficult, if not impossible, to answer. It
will not do to argue that, given the moral nature of the insanity
inquiry, the factfinder is always right. Indeed, the danger of the
guilty but mentally ill option lies in the possibility that it will
tempt the judge or jury to allow extraneous factors, such as sym-
pathy for the victim or concern over the brutal nature of the of-
fense, to enter into their deliberations. In the typical insanity
trial, the underlying sense that the defendant requires treatment
60. Telephone conversation between James Scoles, Alternative Care Coordina-
tor, State of Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, and author (Dec. 10,
1984).
61. The new Alaska insanity statute provides that defendants are not guilty by
reason of insanity when they are "unable, as a result of mental disease or defect, to
appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct." ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (Supp.
1984). This test eliminates an inquiry found even in the restrictive M'Naghten test,
which focuses additionally on whether the accused knows that his or her act was
wrong. See in-fra text accompanying note 121. The new statute also makes insanity
an "affirmative defense." ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (Supp. 1984).
62. Telephone conversation with James Scoles, supra note 60. Because Alaska re-
ported no verdicts of guilty but mentally ill prior to 1984, id, the change in the in-
sanity defense, not the advent of the guilty but mentally ill verdict, most likely caused
the lack of acquittals in 1982 and 1983. See also infra text accompanying notes 114-15
(disputing claim that changes in the insanity formulation have little or no effect on
the factfinder's deliberations).
63. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Final Report), supra note 18, at 7.
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (Michie 1985).
65. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Final Report), supra note 18, at 7.
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may neutralize the jury's outrage at the offense committed,
66
thereby forcing the jury to think through the responsibility issue.
In contrast, the wording of the guilty but mentally ill verdict may
lead jurors and judges to assume that a "guilty" verdict will assure
treatment for the defendant. Thus, the defendant's criminal re-
sponsibility may become less of a concern. This is particularly un-
fortunate because, as dicussed below,6 7 those found guilty but
mentally ill are not guaranteed treatment.
The possibility of improper convictions due to the guilty but
mentally ill verdict is heightened by the difficulty of clearly in-
structing jurors about the difference between the definition of "in-
sanity" and the meaning of "mental illness" in the context of the
guilty but mentally ill verdict. Michigan, for instance, uses the
American Law Institute's formulation of the insanity test: a per-
son is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, "he lacks substan-
tial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. ' 68 In
comparison, Michigan's guilty but mentally ill statute defines
mental illness as "a substantial disorder of thought or mood which
significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize re-
ality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life. '69
Jurors who see little difference between these competing termi-
nologies may choose the guilty but mentally ill verdict solely be-
cause it supposedly results in treatment or longer confinement. A
person with a valid insanity defense may therefore be convicted.
70
66. See supra text accompanying note 48.
67. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
68. MIcH. COmP. LAWS § 768.21a(1) (1982).
69. Id § 330.1400a.
70. The suggestion that confused jurors may misapply the guilty but mentally ill
test is not pure speculation. In People v. Murphy, 416 Mich. 453, 331 N.W.2d 152
(1982), the Michigan Supreme Court struck down a verdict of guilty but mentally ill
and directed an insanity acquittal, noting that even the prosecution's expert agreed
that the defendant was out of touch with reality and unable to control his behavior or
appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts at the time of the offense. 416 Mich. at 462-63,
331 N.W.2d at 156. See also Michigan v. Fultz, 111 Mich. App. 587, 588, 314 N.W.2d 702,
703 (1981) (overturning a verdict of guilty but mentally ill in a bench trial because the
only forensic report in evidence found the defendant insane).
Although its artificial nature diminishes its relevance to the debate on the guilty
but mentally ill verdict, a study by Professors Roberts and Golding is also of interest
here. Professors Roberts and Golding asked University of Illinois students to give
their "verdict" in 16 different vignettes varied according to the degree of mental disor-
der, the bizarreness of the crime, and the planned nature of the crime. Ninety-five
percent of the students found the psychotic defendant who committed an unplanned
act insane when the guilty but mentally ill verdict was not an option, but only 18% of
the students found the same individual insane when the verdict was available. Rob-
erts, Golding & Fincham, Decision-Making and the Insanity Defense: Implicit Theo-
ries of Responsibility 58 (1984) (copy on file at the George Washington Law Review).
Finally, although the insufficient sample sizes bar definitive conclusions, the expe-
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Unfortunately no definition of mental illness is likely to avoid this
result and still meaningfully distinguish between non-insane, "dis-
turbed" offenders and "normal" ones.71
The guilty but mentally ill verdict will not result in de facto
abolition of the insanity defense, as some have predicted.7 2 The
available research suggests that most defendants found guilty but
mentally ill would have been found simply guilty in the absence of
the novel verdict.73 But precisely because any reduction in in-
sanity acquittals which does occur may very well be accomplished
at the expense of improperly convicting the truly insane, the
worth of guilty but mentally ill legislation is suspect at best.
B. The Verdict's Protection of the Public
Adoption of the guilty but mentally ill option has been triggered
as much by the specter of a "lunatic" on the loose as by the feeling
that juries are erroneously finding guilty individuals insane.
rience in Georgia is worth describing. After Georgia passed its guilty but mentally ill
statute the number of judicial insanity determinations decreased only slightly from 13
in 1981 to 12 in 1983, while insanity acquittals by juries decreased 66%, from six to
two. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Final Report), supra note 18, at 7. Thus,
in the one state where the guilty but mentally ill verdict apparently has affected ac-
quittals, the reduced acquittal rate may have been achieved at some loss to the integ-
rity of the system.
71. For example, Pennsylvania uses the M'Naghten test for insanity, 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 314(d) (1983), but, like many guilty but mentally ill jurisdictions, uses a ver-
sion of the ALI's test to define mental illness for purposes of the guilty but mentally
ill verdict. Id. § 314(c)(1). A proposed jury instruction for the state distinguishes be-
tween insanity and mental illness as follows:
Legal insanity requires that the defendant be incapable either of knowing
what he is doing or of judging its wrongfulness. Mental illness requires
only that the defendant lack substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of what he is doing or to obey the law. Loosely speaking,
mental illness is the broader term.
Murphy, Legally Insane or Guilty But Mentally Ilk A Suggested Jury Instruction, 88
DICK. L. REv. 344, 349 (1984) (emphasis in original). If, as is probable, expert wit-
nesses stress that the clinical definition of the word "know" includes emotional appre-
ciation as well as cognitive awareness, jurors easily could find the difference between
mental illness and insanity barely discernible. All things thus being equal, jurors may
rather convict a person who commits a violent crime than find him not guilty by rea-
son of insanity.
72. The American Psychiatric Association calls the guilty but mentally ill alterna-
tive "the abolitionist position in disguise," were it the only option besides guilt or
innocence. APA Statement, supra note 13, at 9. Professor Slovenko likewise has sug-
gested that the guilty but mentally ill verdict "may very well be successful" at "doing
away" with the insanity defense. Slovenko, Commentaries on Psychiatry and Law:
"Guilty But Mentally Ill'; 10 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 541, 549 (1982).
73. Some researchers have attempted to test directly this proposition. In a study
conducted in Michigan, Professors Smith and Hall compared the guilty but mentally
ill group with the not guilty by reason of insanity and guilty groups to assess potential
affinities among them. Smith & Hall, supra note 26, at 95-100. They tentatively con-
cluded that "at least a majority of the [guilty but mentally ill] defendants would have
been found guilty in the absence of the [guilty but mentally ill] statute." Id. at 100.
The National Center for State Courts surveyed officials in those states that have
adopted the guilty but mentally ill verdict and found a majority (78%) of the 74 re-
spondents believed that most offenders would have been found guilty, as opposed to
insane, if the guilty but mentally ill alternative had not been available. NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Telephone Survey), supra note 18, at 31; see also infra
note 115.
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Guilty but mentally ill legislation is supposed to minimize prema-
ture release of dangerous individuals by subjecting mentally ill of-
fenders to sentences linked to their crimes rather than to
institutional confinement predicated on continued mental illness
and dangerousness7 4
The principal reason the guilty but mentally ill verdict fails at
this goal should be apparent. Because the verdict displaces so few
insanity acquittals in the first place,75 it cannot add appreciably to
the public's protection; only a few offenders will be imprisoned
rather than hospitalized in "insane asylums" because of the ver-
dict. Furthermore, the verdict cannot guarantee that the insanity
acquittals it does prevent will involve for the most part recidivistic
offenders.7 6
Even if the guilty but mentally ill verdict were to imprison a
significantly greater number of dangerous, mentally ill individuals
than does the current system, it assures neither longer periods of
confinement nor reduced recidivism. Indeed, as noted earlier, the
average period of confinement is similar for insanity acquittees
and felons tried for the same crime,77 and the recidivism rates for
these two groups are nearly identical7s Moreover, the perception
that imprisonment results in prolonged incarceration is itself illu-
sory: offenders convicted of serious crimes spend, on average, less
than four years in prison for a first offense.79
74. The latter standard is the one typically required for continued commitment of
insanity acquittees. See infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 49-65.
76. The factfinder is not - and should not be - asked to address dangerousness
when deciding which verdict to return. See infra text accompanying notes 105-15.
Admittedly, judges and juries may, in practice, find it difficult to avoid considering
this factor; even so, they certainly cannot predict future violence more effectively
than the professionals Professor Monahan found to be wrong in over fifty percent of
their predictions. See supra note 39.
77. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In states that equate criminal com-
mitment standards and procedures with those used in civil commitment, see supra
note 33 and accompanying text, the confinement of insanity acquittees may be appre-
ciably shortened. To the extent this is so, the guilty but mentally ill verdict results in
longer confinement for those mentally ill offenders who otherwise would have been
found insane. See supra note 35. But see infra note 79.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
79. In an 11-state survey of offenders released between 1979 and 1983, those con-
victed of serious crimes (murder, non-negligent manslaughter, robbery or aggravated
assault) served an average of only 38 months and a median of as few as 33 months.
Koppel, Time Served in Prison, Special Report, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep't of Justice 3 (Tables 1 & 2) (1984).
Those found guilty but mentally ill are likely to serve similar sentences. In all but
one of the guilty but mentally ill jurisdictions that have general parole provisions,
guilty but mentally ill offenders are entitled to parole under the same circumstances
as offenders receiving guilty verdicts. See McGraw, Farthing-Capowich & Keilitz,
supra note 6, at 136-41 (Table 3). To provide otherwise, as Alaska apparently does,
ALAsKA STAT. § 12.47.050(d) (1984), probably violates the equal protection clause.
The only conceivable justification for differential treatment of the guilty but mentally
1985] HeinOnline  -- 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  511 1984-1985
Because the guilty but mentally ill verdict will neither signifi-
cantly decrease the number of insanity acquittees released nor sig-
nificantly add to the confinement imposed on mentally ill
offenders, it is unlikely to influence the public's perception of the
criminal justice system or make the public feel less threatened.
C The Effect of the Verdict on Treatment of Mentally
Ill Offenders
Supporters tout the guilty but mentally ill verdict not only as a
means of paring insanity acquittals and protecting the public, but
also as a mechanism for providing psychiatric treatment to needy
offenders. For instance, the sponsor of Illinois's guilty but men-
tally ill bill emphasized that a defendant found guilty but men-
tally ill "can be ... sentenced exactly as a healthy defendant
charged with the same crime except that his sentence must in-
clude psychiatric and psychological treatment or counselling."80
The Attorney General's Task Force on Violent Crime recom-
mended the verdict in part because it would "enable a jury to be
confident that a defendant who is incarcerated as a result of its
verdict will receive treatment for that illness while confined."81
Such statements mislead for two reasons. First, they suggest
that guilty but mentally ill legislation is necessary to assure treat-
ment for mentally ill offenders. Yet virtually all jurisdictions, in-
cluding those that have adopted guilty but mentally ill statutes,
already provide for treatment of mentally ill prisoners.8 12 For ex-
ample, before Illinois passed its guilty but mentally ill statute in
1981, existing law authorized the transfer of prisoners requiring
psychiatric treatment to special treatment facilities within the De-
partment of Corrections or to mental hospitals.8 3 Similarly, well
before the passage of Indiana's guilty but mentally ill statute, Indi-
ana law mandated the Department of Corrections to "provide for
the care and treatment of every committed offender who is deter-
mined to be mentally ill by a psychiatrist employed or retained by
the department." 4 Thus, to the extent that support of guilty but
ill and the guilty in this context is the mental illness of the former group. Yet the
Supreme Court has firmly held that the state may not confine an individual on the
basis of mental illness alone. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
80. Senate Floor Debate, Senate Bill 867, at 127 (May 27, 1981) (3d reading)
(quoted in Comment, Punishment Versus Treatment of the Guilty But Mentally 17l,
74 J. CRns. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 428, 436 (1983)).
81. U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT
CRIME: FINAL REPORT 54 (1981).
82. Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have enacted special procedures
for transferring mentally ill prisoners to hospital facilities. Four states - Arizona,
Montana, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania - appear to rely on civil commitment law
for this purpose. See Favole, Mental Disability in the American Criminal Process: A
Four Issue Survey, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS, supra note 24, at 281-95.
83. Unified Code of Correction § 3-8-5, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-5 (1982 &
Supp. 1984). In 1981, the legislature amended the statute to require the department
"at periodic intervals to ascertain whether any person committed to it" needs psychi-
atric treatment. Id (Supp. 1984).
84. IND. CODE § 11-10-4-2 (1981).
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mentally ill legislation is bottomed on the perception that statu-
tory authority is needed to provide treatment to prisoners, it is
misguided.
Statements lauding the treatment goals of guilty but mentally
ill legislation also mislead by suggesting that offenders found
guilty but mentally ill will be more likely to receive necessary care
than other convicted offenders. Admittedly, the language of some
guilty but mentally ill legislation supports this interpretation. For
instance, Michigan's statute requires the Department of Correc-
tions to ensure that "the [guilty but mentally ill] defendant... be
given such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated .... ,5
Michigan courts have held that this provision gives guilty but
mentally ill offenders a statutory right to treatment.86 But most
guilty but mentally ill statutes and state courts provide less defi-
nite access to treatment.
For example, the guilty but mentally ill statutes of Illinois, New
Mexico, South Dakota, and Utah vest discretion in the correc-
tional or mental health facility having custody of the offender to
provide such treatment for the defendant as it determines neces-
sary.8 7 The Illinois Court of Appeals has held explicitly that the
Illinois provision does not provide a right to treatment for guilty
but mentally ill offenders beyond the constitutional right to mini-
mally adequate medical care available to all prisoners.8 The
Pennsylvania and Georgia statutes provide for treatment of guilty
but mentally ill offenders only to the extent state funds permit.8 9
Even in Michigan, the "right to treatment" for guilty but mentally
ill offenders has been more abstract than real; Michigan courts
have been extremely cautious about enforcing the right they have
created.9 0
85. MIcH. COmP. LAWS § 768.36 (1982). Other states employ similar language. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.05(b) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 408(b) (Supp. 1984);
IND. CODE § 35-36-2-5(b) (1981); KY. REV. STAT. § 504.150 (1984). But see NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Final Report), supra note 18, at 23 (reading an element
of discretion into the phrase "as psychiatrically indicated"); infra note 87.
86. See, ag., People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 639, 288 N.W.2d 909, 914 (1980).
87. Unified Code of Corrections § 5-2-6, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6 (1981);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31.9.4 (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27-38 (Supp. 1984);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-21.5(4) (Supp. 1983).
88. People v. Marshall, 114 M1. App. 3d 217,233,448 N.E.2d 969, 980 (1983); see also
People v. Smith, 124 M. App. 3d 805, 811, 465 N.E.2d 101, 106 (1984) (failing to assure
treatment to guilty but mentally ill does not render statute unconstitutional).
89. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 9727(b) (Supp. 1984-1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(g)
(Michle 1985).
90. The Michigan courts have actually enforced the so-called statutory "right to
treatment" on only one occasion. People v. Mack, 104 Mich. App. 560, 562, 305 N.W.2d
264, 265-66, (1981). In that case, the sentencing judge had ordered specific treatment;
this order presumably required enforcement even if the defendant had been found
simply guilty. See R.O. DAwsON, SENTENCING 114 n.44 (1969). In other decisions,
Michigan courts have rejected specific right-to-treatment claims. See, e.g., People v.
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This legislative and judicial reticence is probably rooted in the
concern, made explicit in the Pennsylvania and Georgia enact-
ments, that providing effective treatment for all guilty but men-
tally ill offenders might severely test the state's resources. An
equal protection dilemma, which may have influenced the Illinois
court's decision,91 also lurks in the background: on what basis can
the state can justify according a right to treatment to guilty but
mentally ill offenders while denying treatment to prisoners who
are similarly ill?92
These fiscal and legal constraints should tend to minimize dif-
ferences in the treatment of guilty and guilty but mentally ill of-
fenders. The only available data concerning care of prisoners in
guilty but mentally ill jurisdictions support this hypothesis. In a
National Center for State Courts survey of lawyers, administra-
tors, and mental health professionals from eleven states using the
verdict, forty-two of seventy-eight respondents believed guilty but
mentally ill offenders were more likely to receive post-conviction
care. However, thirty-six of these respondents were lawyers and
judges who had no direct contact with treatment programs.93 In a
telling contrast, most administrators familiar with the services
provided for guilty but mentally ill offenders indicated that these
individuals are no more likely to obtain mental health care than
are mentally ill offenders in the general prison population.94 If
this is true, the guilty but mentally ill verdict does not offer any
benefits beyond those available to mentally ill offenders under
current dispositional arrangements. 95
The troubling aspect of the Center's survey is its finding that
most judges and lawyers - and, therefore, presumably most
jurors - believe otherwise. Obviously a perception that those
found guilty but mentally ill are accorded "special" post-convic-
tion treatment, even if true, should not affect the decision on guilt
or insanity. But to the extent that treatment considerations influ-
McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 649, 288 N.W.2d 909, 913 (1980) (the Department of Correc-
tions must be given "a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statutory mandate"
before it is found to violate the guilty but mentally ill legislation); People v. Sharif, 87
Mich. App. 196, 200-01, 274 N.W.2d 17, 19-20 (1978) (failure to give treatment not actu-
ally promised by the trial judge does not require automatic invalidation of a guilty but
mentally ill plea).
91. People v. Marshall, 114 IlM. App. 3d 217, 233, 448 N.E. 2d 969, 980 (1983).
92. Providing treatment to guilty but mentally ill offenders while denying it to
similarly ill prisoners who are not so labeled would be particularly offensive if the
latters' illness occurred after conviction, when the guilty but mentally ill plea is no
longer available.
93. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Telephone Survey), supra note 18, at
48.
94. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Final Report), supra note 18, at 37.
95. In many states, guilty but mentally ill offenders receive post-conviction evalu-
ation more often than do other offenders; therefore, their treatment needs are more
likely to be identified. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(g) (Michie 1985); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 9727(b) (Supp. 1984-1985). But all offenders should receive a thorough
post-conviction evaluation. Obviously the guilty but mentally ill verdict is not the
most efficient way to accomplish the goal. See infra text accompanying notes 144-50.
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ence the factfinder - and research findings suggest they do96 -
the belief that the guilty but mentally ill verdict offers superior
treatment opportunities may lead to improper conviction of the
insane. It may also lead to misguided strategic decisions by
attorneys.
97
Thus, it is not only misleading but dangerous to characterize the
guilty but mentally ill verdict either as a humane advance in the
treatment of mentally ill offenders or as a more effective way to
identify offenders in need of treatment. Undoubtedly, evaluation
and treatment of prisoners can be improved; however, the guilty
but mentally ill verdict is not the appropriate device for achieving
these goals, especially in light of the effect its illusory promise of
special treatment may have on the factfinder.
D. The Verdict's Fffect on Expert Testimony
The psychiatric testimony elicited by the insanity defense has
been characterized as time-consuming, confusing, and "far-
fetched."98 To the public, this is perhaps the most galling aspect of
the defense; many who find fault with the outcome in Hinckley
96. See supra note 48. The promise of treatment offered by the verdict clearly
influenced the guilty but mentally ill findings by the students involved in the Roberts
and Golding study, described supra note 70. The authors found that eighty-six per-
cent of the students thought that "the GBMI [guilty but mentally ill] sentencing alter-
native was moral, just and an adequate means of providing for the treatment needs of
mentally ill offenders." Roberts, Golding & Finchman, supra note 70, at 62 (empha-
sis added).
97. Most guilty but mentally ill verdicts result from plea bargains rather than
jury trials. In Georgia, for instance, 134 (eighty-six percent) of the 157 guilty but men-
tally ill verdicts between passage of the statute in 1982 and the end of 1984 were by
plea. In Illinois roughly 65% of the guilty but mentally ill verdicts in the four years
following passage of guilty but mentally ill legislation were by plea. NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Final Report), supra note 18, at 7,14. This willingness to
plead guilty but mentally ill may be sparked by an intuitive belief that the verdict is
less stigmatizing than a straight guilty verdict. But, if the the National Center for
State Courts survey is representative, the popularity of the verdict probably stems
from the defense attorney's erroneous belief that defendants are more likely to re-
ceive treatment by pleading guilty but mentally ill. To prevent such misconceptions,
the Kentucky Public Advocate's Office has established an educational program
designed in part to educate attorneys about the availability of treatment under the
guilty but mentally ill verdict. Apparently the Office fears that defense attorneys will
plead their clients guilty but mentally ill to crimes or agree to sentences to which they
would not have assented had they known treatment would not necessarily be pro-
vided. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Telephone Survey), supra note 18, at
37.
98. See, e.g., L. COLEMAN, THE REIGN OF ERROR 36-64 (1984); W. WINSLADE, THE
INSANITY PLEA: THE USES AND ABUSES OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 3 (1983). Partly as
a result of these concerns, some commentators suggest that psychiatric testimony be
prohibited or severely limited in insanity adjudications. See, e.g., Morse, Crazy Behav-
ior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527,
602-14 (1978).
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are particularly critical of the prolonged battle of the experts
waged during the trial.99
Some proponents of the guilty but mentally ill verdict claim the
verdict will minimize participation of mental health professionals
in criminal cases by discouraging assertion of the insanity de-
fense.100 But this claim flies in the face of logic. In most states,
the guilty but mentally ill verdict is not available unless the de-
fendant asserts an insanity defense; 01 thus, in these states, the
verdict is likely to increase the number of insanity pleas. 02 Re-
search confirms that after states pass guilty but mentally ill legis-
lation, the combined number of insanity acquittals and guilty but
mentally ill verdicts far exceeds the number of previous insanity
acquittals. For instance, Georgia, which passed its statute in 1982,
had fifty-six acquittals in 1981, but forty-two acquittals and eighty-
eight guilty but mentally ill verdicts in 1983. More relevant to the
"battle of the experts" issue, the fifty-six insanity acquittals in
1981 involved only nineteen trials, whereas the 130 insanity
acquittals and guilty but mentally ill verdicts in 1983 involved a
combined total of twenty-four trials.103 Thus, it is difficult to im-
agine how the guilty but mentally ill verdict would reduce expert
involvement at any stage of the criminal process.
A National Center for State Courts survey further supports this
conclusion. The Center surveyed the effect of the guilty but men-
tally ill verdict on expert participation, and found that thirty-
seven of forty-six respondents believed the verdict to have had no
effect on the nature and frequency of expert participation. Five
respondents felt it had increased (or would increase) the involve-
ment of mental health professionals in the criminal justice
system. 04
Available information thus indicates that the guilty but men-
tally ill verdict will significantly diminish neither the number of
trials involving battles of the experts, nor the role of mental
health professionals generally. Certainly, nothing indicates that
99. See, e.g., L. COLEMAN, supra note 98, at 36,43; Will, Insanity... And Success,
Wash. Post, June 23, 1982, at A27, col. 1 ("The [Hinckley] trial allowed - indeed,
required - a jury to pick between numerous flatly incompatible theories spun by
credentialed 'experts,' theories purporting to divine Hinckley's mental state on one
day 15 months [before the trial].").
100. In a survey of 46 legal and mental health professionals, four believed the
guilty but mentally ill verdict would reduce the participation of mental health profes-
sionals in the criminal justice system. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CouRTs (Tele-
phone Survey), supra note 18, at 39, 40.
101. Ky. REV. STAT. § 504-130(2) (Supp. 1982); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 768.20(a)(1),
768.36(2) (1982).
102. See, e.g., supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing Michigan).
103. Fourteen trials resulted in insanity acquittals and 10 in guilty but mentally ill
verdicts. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTs (Descriptive Data), supra note 18, at
7 (Table). Michigan reported 222 guilty but mentally ill verdicts and 381 insanity ver-
dicts in the seven years after passage of the guilty but mentally ill act, as opposed to
270 insanity verdicts before passage of the act. Blunt & Stock, supra note 16, at 5, 13
(Table 2).
104. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CouRTS (Telephone Survey), supra note 18, at
39.
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the verdict has successfully kept psychiatrists and psychologists
out of the courtroom or the pre-trial evaluation process.
The guilty but mentally verdict does not seem to be achieving its
intended goals. It has not substantially reduced insanity acquittals
nor enhanced public safety. It has not appreciably improved treat-
ment for mentally ill offenders and has failed to affect expert in-
volvement in criminal adjudications. Consequently, any
improvement in the public's perception of the insanity defense, or
the criminal justice system in general, is unlikely.
At the same time, guilty but mentally ill legislation has injected
a misleading and confusing element into criminal adjudications
which could lead to inappropriate resolution of cases involving the
insanity defense. This aspect of the verdict, although perhaps not
particularly troublesome to the public, is a cost which must be
weighed against the verdict's minimal practical and symbolic
benefits.
III. A Verdict in Name Only
The guilty but mentally ill verdict not only fails on the prag-
matic front. It is flawed conceptually as well. Even if the verdict
successfully achieved its goals of reducing inappropriate insanity
acquittals and effectuating better treatment of mentally ill offend-
ers, its adoption should be resisted on the theoretical ground that
it introduces an alien and irrelevant concept into the criminal trial
process.
The purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether the de-
fendant has committed a crime as defined by the legislature. The
prosecution must prove the actus reus and mens rea for the crime
charged beyond a reasonable doubt105 and must also, in effect, con-
vince the factfinder, by at least a preponderance of the evidence,
that there is no justification or excuse for the defendant's acts.106
Mental illness may be relevant to each of these determinations.
It could diminish the defendant's ability to exert conscious control
over his actions,10 7 negate mens rea,10 8 cause a mistaken belief that
105. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1969) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute a crime).
106. Although some jurisdictions require the defendant to bear the burden of per-
suasion for "affirmative defenses" such as insanity, entrapment, or self-defense, they
allow the defendant to meet this burden by a preponderance of the evidence. W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIuNAL LAW 56-51 (1972); see, e.g., People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d
288, 297, 363 P.2d 865, 869, 14 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637 (1961) (requiring proof of insanity
defense by a preponderance of the evidence). In effect, then, unless the prosecution
can produce evidence sufficient to convict of "equal" or greater persuasiveness than
the defendant's contrary evidence, the prosecution cannot secure a conviction.
107. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 71 IM. 2d 551, 554, 377 N.E.2d 4, 8 (1978).
108. At least 10 states have adopted provisions similar to Model Penal Code
1985] HeinOnline  -- 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.  517 1984-1985
a criminal act was justified 0 9 or, through the insanity defense,
provide an excuse for the criminal act.110
But the jury's finding of mental illness needed to render a ver-
dict of guilty but mentally ill is not pertinent to any of these con-
siderations. It results neither in acquittal nor reduction in the
grade of offense. Nor is sentence length affected by the verdict,
because the verdict is not a finding of diminished responsibility;
thus, the judge may impose any sentence authorized by law for the
crime involved. " In fact, sentences imposed on guilty but men-
tally ill offenders do not appear to differ from the sentences im-
posed on other offenders." 2
A guilty but mentally ill finding does not even mitigate culpabil-
ity in the attenuated sense of improving post-conviction treatment
status. In deliberating upon the applicability of the verdict, the
factfinder's evaluation is limited to the defendant's mental illness
at the time of the offense.113 Although jurors may allow concern
about treatability to influence their decision, guilty but mentally
ill legislation appropriately recognizes that the dispositive treat-
ment determination be made by experts after conviction, not by
lay factfinders at trial.14 To provide otherwise would force a deci-
sion on judges and juries they are ill-equipped to make.115
§ 4.02(1), which provides: "Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental dis-
ease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or
did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); see also MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra
note 12, 7-6.2 & commentary (permitting introduction of defendant's mental condition
at time of offense as evidence of mental state).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 586 (2d Cir. 1975); People v.
Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 326-27, 583 P.2d 1308, 1314, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 271 (1978)
(superseded by CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(a) (Deering Supp. 1985)).
110. See infra text accompanying notes 116-22 (summarizing the various insanity
tests).
111. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(g) (Michie 1985); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-5(a)
(1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-27-38 (Supp. 1984).
112. For instance, those found guilty but mentally ill in Georgia received an aver-
age sentence of 11.76 years, compared to an average sentence of just over nine years
for all Georgia offenders. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Descriptive Data),
supra note 18, at 27. The greater sentences for guilty but mentally ill offenders may
in part result from the types of crimes for which they are convicted.
113. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040(b) (1984); KY. REV. STAT. § 504.130(1)(b)
(1984); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 314(a) (1983).
114. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(g) (Michie 1985); IND. CODE § 35-36-2-5(b)
(1981); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9727(b) (Supp. 1985).
115. In fact, a significant proportion (ranging between 25 and 75%) of those found
guilty but mentally ill do not need treatment. The director of Michigan's Forensic
Psychiatry Center has stated that 75% of those found guilty but mentally ill are sent
to prison and receive "no treatment." Statement of Bill Meyer, Director, Forensic
Psychiatry Center, State of Michigan, at State Mental Health Directors Third Annual
Conference (Sept. 29, 1982) (copy on file at the George Washington Law Review).
However, another Michigan study concluded that 72% of those found guilty but men-
tally ill were in need of treatment: this percentage of offenders was recommended for
one or more mental health services, such as psychotherapy, individual or group coun-
seling, sex-offender programs, substance-abuse assistance, and psychotropic medica-
tion. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Final Report), supra note 18, at 36.
Similarly, Georgia recommended some form of mental health services for 64% per-
cent of those found guilty but mentally ill. Id
Varying definitions of "treatment" probably account for the differences among
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Accordingly, the guilty but mentally ill verdict is not a proper
"verdict" at all. Indeed, the "mentally ill" component of the ver-
dict serves no identifiable purpose; even if the verdict does reduce
insanity acquittals and comfort the factfinder, it does not do so
within the theoretical framework of the criminal law. Instead, it
embroils the trier of fact in a conceptually meaningless inquiry,
and for this reason alone, the guilty but mentally ill scheme is
unacceptable.
IV. A Coherent Approach to the "Insanity
Defense Problem"
Rather than adopt a theoretically unsound verdict that produces
uncertain effects, those hoping to rectify the problems associated
with the insanity defense should attack those problems directly.
If the goal is to reduce improper acquittals by reason of insanity,
attention should be focused on the proper scope of the insanity
defense. If it is to prevent premature release of insane persons,
the criteria for committing and releasing these individuals should
be re-examined. If the concern is proper treatment of the men-
tally ill offender, sentencing and prison transfer provisions should
be re-evaluated. And if it is believed that expert testimony is too
confusing or unscientific, appropriate limitations on such testi-
mony should be formulated. The recommendations found in the
American Bar Association Criminal Justice Mental Health Stan-
dards attempt to achieve each of these goals.
these studies. Mr. Meyer seemingly refers to the number of guilty but mentally ill
offenders requiring extensive mental health intervention, as opposed to the type of
"treatment program" accorded almost every offender at one time or another.
As Mr. Meyer has stated elsewhere: "Mhe folks who are pleading 'guilty but men-
tally ill'. . . tend to be sex offenders, there tends to be very good evidence against
them, and not a very good possibility of them being found 'not guilty by reason of
insanity' because there is no evidence of mental illness." NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH
ASSOCIATION, supra note 14, at 33.
Although definitional quibbles obscure the number of guilty-but-mentally-ill of-
fenders who require "treatment," it is clear that most guilty-but-mentally-ill offend-
ers do not receive hospital treatment. Of the 43 defendants found guilty but mentally
ill in Indiana over a 21 month period, only two were transferred to mental hospitals;
moreover, the two guilty-but-mentally-ill transferees represented only six percent of
all offenders transferred. Memorandum by Juliette Spence, Governor's Fellow, Indi-
ana Department of Mental Health 3 (Sept. 24, 1984) (copy on file at the George Wash-
ington Law Review). Similarly, of the 45 defendants found guilty but mentally ill in
Illinois over a 13 month period, all have been incarcerated in the Department of Cor-
rections. Statement of Terry Brelje, Coordinator for the Forensic Psychiatry Pro-
gram at Chester Mental Health Center, Illinois, at Mental Health Forensic Directors
Third Annual Conference (Sept. 29, 1982) (copy on file at the George Washington
Law Review).
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A. Recasting the Insanity Defense
The Durham rule186 is probably the most expansive insanity
formulation, permitting a finding of nonresponsibility if the crimi-
nal act was the product of the defendant's mental disease or de-
fect. Today only New Hampshire adheres to the product test.117
Almost half the states follow the American Law Institute's test,118
which excuses any act resulting from a mental disease or defect
that substantially impaired the actor's capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of the act or conform his behavior at the time of the
act to the requirements of the law. 19 Most of the remaining
states'2 0 use the M'Naghten test,' 2 ' which provides an insanity de-
fense when a mental disease or defect caused the actor not to
know the nature and quality or wrongfulness of the criminal act.
A few states combine the "irresistible impulse" test with the
M'Naghten test.2
2
The American Bar Association has rejected all of these insanity
tests, reasoning that the Durham rule, the ALI's test, and the irre-
sistible impulse test are all unnecessarily broad and that the
M'Naghten test is too restrictive. Instead, the Mental Health Stan-
dards adopt the following formulation:
(a) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, at the
time of such conduct, and as a result of mental disease or defect,
that person was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of such
conduct. (b) When used as a legal term in this standard "mental
disease or defect" refers to: (i) impairments of mind, whether
enduring or transitory; or, (ii) mental retardation, either of
which substantially affected the mental or emotional processes
of the defendant at the time of the alleged offense.2 3
Although this test does not revert to the M'Naghten rule, it lim-
116. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), provided the modern
formulation of the product test or Durham rule. (Durham itself was overruled by
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). However, the New
Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 402 (1870),
originated the product test.
117. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 628:2 (1974 & Supp. 1983); see also Favole, supra note
79, at 264 (discussing various courts' applications of the product test).
118. Favole, supra note 82, at 259.
119. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
120. Favole, supra note 82, at 259-69.
121. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719 (H.L. 1843). For a general dis-
cussion of the M'Naghten test, see W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw 274-83
(1972).
122. See Favole, supra note 82, at 259-69. The irresistible impulse test protects the
defendant from liability even if he knew he was committing a wrong, provided he
possessed a mental disease that prevented him from controlling his conduct. See id at
260-61, 264, 268.
123. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12, 7-6.1. The American Psychiatric
Association also has proposed the elimination of a volitional prong from the insanity
test. APA statement, supra note 13, at 12. One state uses an insanity test similar to
the one recommended in the Mental Health Standards. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-04-03
(1981); see I. KEIITZ & J. FULTON, THE INSANITY DEFENSE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES: A
GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS 16-17 (1984). Additionally, as of October 12, 1984, the fed-
eral courts, which had uniformly endorsed the ALI's test, see Favole, supra note 82, at
266-68, must follow a version of the "appreciation" formula. Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 4241(d), 98 Stat. 1976, 2065-66.
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its the availability of the insanity defense to defendants suffering
from substantial cognitive or affective impairment at the time of
the offense. The drafters of the ABA's formulation assumed that
any "moral mistakes" in the administration of the insanity
defense are most likely to result from the use of a volitional or
"control" test in conjunction with vague or broad interpretations
of "mental disease." The separate volitional test poses the great-
est risk because it is virtually impossible to distinguish an irresisti-
ble impulse from an impulse that merely was not resisted;
consequently, virtually all mentally ill persons may plausibly
make the former claim.24 In contrast, the ABA's test limits the
responsibility inquiry to the more manageable issue of determin-
ing the extent to which a person's awareness, perceptions, and un-
derstanding of the criminal event were impaired. Under this test,
if mentally ill or retarded individuals who found it difficult to
choose law-abiding conduct are exculpated, it will be because the
severity of their illness or retardation also impaired their ability to
appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct.325
The ABA's standard thus differs from most other insanity tests.
But will it also change the results of the insanity inquiry? Profes-
sors Goldstein and Simon have claimed that the precise language
of the insanity test has little or no effect on the outcome. 2 6 But
data from California suggest that restricting the scope of the de-
fense can affect insanity acquittals. In 1983, the year after Califor-
nia switched from the ALI's test to an insanity formulation
similar to the ABA's, insanity acquittals dropped almost fifty per-
cent despite an increase in felony arrests for that year.2 7 Further-
more, neither Professor Goldstein nor Professor Simon recognize
124. See Bonnie, supra note 2, at 196-97.
125. Michael Moore proposes a different conceptual approach that produces the
same result. He suggests the factfinder may find insanity when the accused "is so
irrational as to be nonresponsible." M. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING
THE RELATIONSHIP 245 (1984). By shifting the focus of the insanity inquiry to the
rationality of one's reasons for acting, Moore's formulation makes the degree to which
one is "compelled" irrelevant. See Slobogin, A Rational Approach to Responsibility,
83 MICH. L. REV. 820, 830 (1985).
126. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 21, at 213-14; SIMON, supra note 48, at 215. However,
Professor Simon found that jurors were 12% more likely to find a defendant insane
under the Durham rule than under the M'Naghten test, a statistically significant dif-
ference. I
127. Interim Hearing on the Insanity Defense and Provisions Governing Release
of the Criminally Insane, Before the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1983) (testimony of Michael O'Connor). By year, insanity acquittals in California
totalled: 1977, 170; 1978, 187; 1979, 270; 1980, 247; 1981, 269; 1982, 218; 1983, 134 (pro-
jected). Id. (Table I).
Also of note is the significant increase in acquittals between 1978 and 1979. In 1978,
the California Supreme Court abandoned the M'Naghten test and adopted the ALI's
formulation. People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 349, 583 P.2d 1318, 1326, 149 Cal. Rptr.
275, 283 (1978) (in June 1982, California voters renounced the Drew decision in Propo-
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that varying the language of the insanity test also may affect the
acquittal rate by influencing decisions made before the jury re-
tires. Indeed, the specific terminology of a particular test might
color a constellation of decisions: the expert's decision to testify
and to formulate specific testimony; the lawyer's strategic decision
to assert the defense, to conduct direct and cross-examination, and
to formulate arguments to present to the jury; and the judge's de-
cision concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, from the
time a defendant contemplates an insanity defense to the moment
the jury reaches its verdict, the specific language of the insanity
test may have a substantial, cumulative effect on the defendant's
case. The difference in impact would likely be particularly pro-
nounced if the choice of language evidenced a purely cognitive
standard rather than a volitional one.
By focusing on those aspects of mental dysfunction most clearly
relevant to the insanity inquiry and most likely to accurately be
discerned, the Mental Health Standards' approach to the insanity
defense should substantially rectify any tendency on the part of
judges and juries to misinterpret the proper scope of the insanity
defense. The guilty but mentally ill verdict, in contrast, does not
even address these issues, much less resolve them. Instead, the
verdict distracts the factfinder from the task of determining crimi-
nal responsibility.
Proponents of the guilty but mentally ill verdict might still in-
sist, however, that the verdict aids juries agonizing over the reso-
lution of difficult cases. Professor Simon's data suggest that, even
with a tightened definition of insanity, jurors may feel uncomfort-
able choosing between insanity on the one hand and guilt on the
other. 28 But that is the choice they must make. Jurors should
not be offered a compromise option merely to make their decision
less painful.
Moreover, a legitimate way to ease the decisiomaker's burden
does exist: as the Mental Health Standards recommend, the court
can instruct the jury about the consequences of an insanity ver-
dict . 29 Research indicates that, at best, jurors have inconsistent
sition 8, replacing the ALI's test with the M'Naghten test, codified at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 25(b) (Deering Supp. 1985)).
Of course, changes in the language of the insanity test may not be the sole reason
for the variations in California's acquittal rates. For example, in 1978, the same year
that Drew was decided, the California Supreme Court held that insanity acquittees
may be confined beyond the maximum term of their sentences only if the state estab-
lishes that they remain a danger to themselves or others. In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457,
467, 584 P.2d 1097, 1103-04, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491, 497-98 (1978) (these criteria are codified
at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5(b)(1) (Deering Supp. 1985)). Moye may have made in-
sanity pleas more attractive. Similarly, the outcry over the Hinckley verdict and the
publicity accompanying the vote on Proposition 8, both of which occurred in 1982, may
have changed the attitude of the public, and therefore of juries and judges, toward the
insanity defense.
128. See supra note 48. Professor Simon derived her conclusion from responses
made by jurors who had experienced simulations using M'Naghten and Durham in-
structions. SIMON, supra note 48, at 161-70.
129. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12, 7-6.8. The standard provides:
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perceptions about the fate of insanity acquittees. 130 Informing
jurors of the precautions governing the release of an acquittee' 31
alleviates their concern for public safety,132 and helps them focus
on the morally appropriate inquiry of criminal responsibility.
Knowledge of dispositional consequences, combined with a re-
structured insanity defense, should assure reasoned decisions on
the insanity issue.
B. The Appropriate Disposition of Insanity Acquittees
Because insanity acquittees have been acquitted, they cannot be
punished; the state may confine them only on incapacitative and
rehabilitative grounds.las Requiring acquittees to serve specific
"The court should instruct the jury as to the dispositional consequences of a verdict of
not guilty by reason of mental nonresponsibility [insanity]." Id
130. A relevant study found that the overwhelming majority of jurors realize that
dangerous persons are not released upon acquittal by reason of insanity. SmtoN, supra
note 48, at 38. However, Professor Simon's methodology has been criticized and Pro-
fessor Simon herself has expressed ambivalence about her conclusions. See Schwartz,
Should Juries Be Informed of the Consequences of the Insanity Verdict? 1980 J. PSY-
CHIATRY & L. 167, 173-74. Another study found some correspondence between guilty
verdicts and fear that an insanity acquittal would lead to release; however, overall
jurors had consistent perceptions about the disposition of acquittees. Morris, Bozzetti,
Rusk & Read, Whither Thou Goest? An Inquiry into Jurors'Perceptions of the Con-
sequences of a Successful Insanity Defense, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1058, 1067, 1068
(1977). Given the absence of solid empirical data, the ABA's task force opted for giv-
ing the instruction. The commentary to Standard 7-6.8 states: "Jurors surely know,
without being told, what happens to most convicted offenders, as well as defendants
who are acquitted outright; the proposed instruction seeks to provide the same level
of knowledge with respect to the fate of persons acquitted by reason of [insanity]."
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12, commentary at 374.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 140-45.
132. In a jurisdiction adopting Mental Health Standards 7-7.2 to .5 and 7-7.7 to .8, an
appropriate jury instruction might read.
If the defendant is found "not guilty by reason of insanity", the defendant
will be committed for evaluation for approximately 30 days, after which
this court will hold a hearing to consider evidence about the defendant's
mental condition. If, as a result of this hearing, the court finds that the
defendant is mentally ill or mentally retarded and that he poses a substan-
tial threat of bodily harm to others, or that he does not meet these criteria
solely because he is undergoing treatment which is not likely to continue
unless he is committed to a secure facility, then the defendant will be con-
fined in a secure facility for a term not to exceed the maximum term of
confinement he would have received had you found him guilty of the of-
fense charged. He may be released before this term is expired if a court
finds either that he is no longer disordered or that he no longer poses a
threat of bodily harm to others and that he does not require continued
confinement in order to assure that he will remain in this improved
condition.
MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12, 7-6.8 commentary at 375.
133. See generally German & Singer, supra note 31 (finding no basis for any differ-
entiation between insanity acquittees and civil committees); Morris, supra note 30.
See also Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366 (1983) (concluding that the "purpose
of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment, is to
treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential
dangerousness").
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terms would be illogical, if not unconstitutional.'3 Although re-
lease of insanity acquittees must therefore be predicated on prob-
lematic predictions of dangerousness and treatability, public
safety still may be considered when devising schemes for criminal
commitment.
Several states, on equal protection grounds, have equated the
criteria for release of insanity acquittees with those used in civil
commitment. 35 Thus, in these states, the prosecution must prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the insanity acquittee is
mentally ill and dangerous, as required in the civil commitment
context under Addington v. Texas.13 6 In Jones v. United States,
137
however, the Supreme Court suggested that the Constitution does
not require this approach to criminal commitment. In the course
of sanctioning automatic commitment for evaluation following an
insanity acquittal, the Court held that mental illness may be pre-
sumed from the fact of acquittal and that dangerousness may be
presumed from the acquittee's commission of a criminal act.
Although this reasoning is questionable, 38 courts now appear to
have solid constitutional authority for imposing relatively more
restrictive release criteria on insanity acquittees, including shift-
ing the burden of proof to the defendant.
39
As with the scope of the insanity defense itself, the Mental
Health Standards take a compromise position on the disposition
issue. Under the Mental Health Standards, any acquittee found to
have committed an act causing or threatening serious bodily harm
automatically may be confined for evaluation for up to thirty days,
or longer, if good cause is shown. 40 After this evaluation, the
court may, subject to periodic review, commit the acquittee for a
term not to exceed the maximum sentence associated with the of-
fense charged.' 4 ' In order to commit the defendant after the eval-
134. In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), the Court refused to base an
acquittee's hospital stay on the length of the sentence he would have received if con-
victed. Id. at 368-69.
135. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. The courts generally reason that
because insanity acquittees are "acquitted" of the crime charged, they are similarly
situated to civil committees, and are entitled to the same procedural and substantive
safeguards.
136. 441 U.S. 418, 443 (1979).
137. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
138. For instance, the mental illness that caused insanity at the time of the offense
quite possibly will be in remission due to treatment or natural causes by the time of
trial. Similarly, although prior violent acts are probably the best predictors of future
acts, Monahan, supra note 39, at 71, such acts do not justify a presumption of danger-
ousness, but rather should merely provide data relevant to the dangerousness predic-
tion. Moreover, as in Jones, the act that led to criminal charges may not be
"dangerous." See Note, supra note 31, at 608-12.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In re
Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 141, 496 P.2d 465, 474, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 562 (1972); State v.
Taylor, 158 Mont. 323, 331-32, 491 P.2d 877, 882 (1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 978 (1972).
140. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12,7-7.2. For acts not involving seri-
ous bodily harm, the commentary to standard 7-7.3 suggests that, to the extent inca-
pacitation is necessary, civil commitment procedures are adequate. Id, 7-7.3
commentary at 406.
141. Id, 7-7.7 to .8.
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uation period and to continue the commitment upon later review,
the court must find that the acquittee is mentally ill or mentally
retarded and poses a substantial threat of serious bodily harm to
others, or that the acquittee does not meet these criteria solely
because he is undergoing treatment or rehabilitation that is likely
to end unless commitment continues. The state must prove
mental illness or retardation and threat of harm by clear and con-
vincing evidence; the acquittee must disprove the need for contin-
ued confinement by a preponderance of the evidence. 14
In most respects, therefore, the Mental Health Standards equate
criminal commitment with civil commitment. However, the addi-
tion of the third criterion, requiring the acquittee to prove that
successful treatment will continue upon release, forestalls prema-
ture discharge of acquittees potentially unwilling to continue med-
ication outside the hospital. Moreover, unlike typical civil
commitment statutes,143 the Mental Health Standards do not dele-
gate the discharge decision to hospital staff, but rather require ju-
dicial involvement.1 " The Mental Health Standards also provide
for conditional release of insanity acquittees, revocable by the
hospital superintendent or court whenever either believes the ac-
quittee has violated a condition of treatment or any other condi-
tion of leave.1 45 The occasional release of "false positives" cannot
be avoided. But the Mental Health Standards admirably balance
society's right to be protected with the nondangerous insanity ac-
quittee's right to be free of confinement.
C. Caring for the Mentally Ill Offender
The Mental Health Standards provide a comprehensive approach
to improving both the quality of post-conviction treatment, and
the procedures for obtaining it. They require the state to provide
expert assistance at sentencing to help identify the treatment
needs of indigent defendants. 146 They also allow the offender and
the prosecution to initiate proceedings before or during the sen-
tencing hearing to determine whether the offender is severely
mentally disabled.147 Once sentenced, the mentally ill or mentally
retarded offender is guaranteed a right to treatment, either in
142. Id. 7-7.4. At the commitment and review hearings the acquittee is entitled to
counsel, and to confront witnesses. The state bears the costs if the acquittee cannot
afford them. Trial rules of evidence apply. Id 7-7.5.
143. As of 1976, only 19 states required a hearing before the committing court in
order for an insanity acquittee to obtain release. German & Singer, supra note 31, at
1076-79.
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prison, or if an adversarial hearing confirms a severe disability, in
a mental health or mental retardation facility.1 48 Committed of-
fenders are entitled to periodic review and transfer back to a cor-
rectional facility once they are no longer considered seriously
mentally ill or mentally retarded.149 The Mental Health Stan-
dards also provide procedures for allowing a prisoner to seek hos-
pital services voluntarily.1 50
The ABA's approach makes unnecessary the creation of a new
verdict to secure treatment for mentally ill offenders. If a state is
serious about providing treatment for these individuals, regardless
of their legal label, the approach recommended in the Mental
Health Standards is far superior to the discriminatory route taken
by guilty but mentally ill legislation.
D. Expert Testimony
Much of the blame for verdicts like the one reached in Hinckley
falls on the mental health experts who testify at trial. Yet, as Pro-
fessor Bonnie has pointed out, this blame is misplaced:
The bench and bar are ultimately responsible for improving the
administration of justice. If judges and juries are confused or
misled by expert testimony, this usually means there has been
poor lawyering. If experts give conclusory testimony, encom-
passing so-called ultimate issues-and fail to explain the bases
for their opinions- the fault lies with the bench and bar, not
with the experts. If forensic evaluators do not have access to the
same information and reach different opinions for this reason,
the fault lies with the legal system, not with the experts.1 1
The only way in which the guilty but mentally ill verdict even
approaches addressing the problems identified by Professor Bon-
nie is by attempting to reduce the number of trials in which the
insanity defense is raised, thereby hoping to reduce as well the
frequency with which battles of the experts occur. If the verdict
works at all in this area, it works circuitously. 52
The Mental Health Standards, on the other hand, grapple di-
rectly with the issue of expert testimony. They seek to educate
and train lawyers, judges, and mental health professionals about
the mental health professional's role in the criminal process. 53
They establish criteria for qualifying mental health professionals
as experts. 54 They prohibit experts from testifying on the ulti-
148. Id. 7-9.7; 7-9.11; 7-10.8.
149. Id. 7-9.14; 7-10.6.
150. Id. 7-10.3; 7-10.4.
151. Bonnie, Morality, Equality, and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relationship Be-
tween Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCIATRY & L. 5,5-6
(1984).
152. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
153. MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, supra note 12, 7-1.3.
154. Id. 7-3.10 (requiring the court to consider a witness's professional education,
training, experience, and forensic knowledge before qualifying a witness as an ex-
pert); 7-3.11 (specifying types of knowledge required for a witness to be qualified as an
expert); 7-3.12 (establishing minimum professional education and clinical training re-
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mate legal issue' 55 and require them to reveal the theoretical and
factual bases for those opinions that may legitimately be offered to
the factfinder.156 With due regard for the defendant's fifth and
sixth amendment rights, they allow prompt access to the defend-
ant by prosecution as well as defense experts, 57 and mandate full
exchange of other information pertaining to the defendant's
mental state at the time of the offense. 58
If states conscientiously implemented these provisions, insanity
trials would provide for the orderly transfer of information and
would seldom confuse the factfinder. The potential for battles of
the experts will always exist in adversarial systems of adjudica-
tion. But the negative aspects of this process can be minimized,
and its positive attributes accentuated, by promoting the policies
defined in the Mental Health Standards.
Conclusion
The guilty but mentally ill verdict is an ill-conceived and ineffec-
tive overreaction to the problems associated with the insanity de-
fense. The verdict's popularity stems not from considered analysis
of its actual impact or of the available alternatives, but rather
from its appearance of "doing something" about public safety,
treatment of mentally ill offenders, and expert testimony. This
Article has attempted to assess both the worth of the verdict and
the value of the available alternatives, in particular those pro-
posed by the American Bar Association. The conclusion is ines-
capable that the guilty but mentally ill verdict is an idea whose
time should not have come.
quirements for experts); 7-3.13 (establishing qualification requirements for witnesses
proffered as experts on scientific and clinical research).
155. Id 7-3.9; 7-6.6. Standard 7-3.9 states in part: "[The expert witness should not
express, or be permitted to express, an opinion on any question requiring a conclusion
of law or a moral or social value judgment properly reserved to the court or the jury."
Id. 7-3.9.
156. Id- 7-3.14.
157. Id 7-3.4 (allowing prosecution experts access to the defendant within forty-
eight hours of the defense's evaluation, provided the results of the prosecution's eval-
uation are sealed until the defendant gives notice of a defense).
158. Id. 7-3.6(c) (permitting presence of defense attorney during prosecution evalu-
ation, provided examiner agrees); 7-3.6(d) (providing for recording of court-ordered
evaluations); 7-3.8 (permitting prompt discovery of information regarding the defend-
ant's mental state and requiring the prosecution and defense to exchange information
once the defendant gives notice of a defense); 7-3.2 (prohibiting the prosecution from
using any evaluation results unless they relate to the mental-condition issue raised by
the defendant); see also id 7-6.3; (requiring a defendant to notify prosecution within
pretrial filing period of intention to rely on mental nonresponsibility defense); 7-6.4
(providing for court-ordered evaluation of defendant upon prosecutor's motion); 7-6.5
(requiring prosecution to disclose all information bearing on defendant's mental
condition).
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